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For hundreds of millions of people, hardly a day goes by without at
least a brief visit to a social network website, such as Facebook. Social
network websites play a major role in social life and politics across the
globe, shaping how individuals interact with each other and how political
movements organize and communicate with the public at large. While,
thus far, social network websites have served as relatively open and free
forums for speech, they face a number of external and internal pressures
to censor content. The prospect of censorship by social network websites
is especially troubling because it is unclear whether the First Amendment
provides any protections for communications on social network websites.
Privately owned spaces, like these websites, are ordinarily shielded from
First Amendment scrutiny by the state action doctrine.
This article argues that federal courts can and should extend First
Amendment protections to communications on social network websites
due to the importance these websites have assumed as forums for speech
and public discourse. Part I provides background on social network websites. Part I.A discusses the importance of social network websites in contemporary social life and politics. Part I.B explores the pressures that
might lead social network websites to censor content, as well as the potential implications of such censorship.
Part II explains how First Amendment protections can be extended
to communications on social network websites in order to mitigate this
threat of censorship. Part II.A sets aside the threshold issue of state action in order to demonstrate that public communications on social network websites are especially deserving of First Amendment protection,
because they simultaneously invoke the three First Amendment freedoms
of speech, press, and association. Part II.B then argues that courts can
and should deem censorial acts by social network websites to be state
action under the public function exception to the state action doctrine
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and, where possible, the entwinement exception to the state action
doctrine.
Because courts may cite the availability of alternative paths to protection of communications on social network websites as a rationale for
not taking the route argued for by Part II.B, Part III briefly examines
whether state constitutional law, state and federal legislation, and federal
media access regulations might also be able to provide protections for
communications on social network websites. Part III demonstrates that
each of these alternatives is less viable and less desirable than court-recognized First Amendment protections for communications on social network websites.
I. SOCIAL NETWORK WEBSITES AND THE THREAT
OF CENSORSHIP
A. Social Network Websites in Contemporary Social Life and Politics
In recent years, social network websites such as Facebook,1
Google+, Instagram, Myspace, Tumblr, Twitter, and YouTube have become a prominent feature of the online landscape. Currently, two-thirds
of all Americans with internet access are users of a social network website,2 and many users of the most popular social network websites make
visits to such sites a near-daily ritual.3 Facebook, the world’s most popular
social network website,4 has over 800 million users worldwide and can
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1. Because Facebook is currently the most widely known and paradigmatic example of a social network website, this Article will primarily use Facebook to illustrate its points.
2. Aaron Smith, Why Americans Use Social Media, PEW INTERNET (Nov. 15,
2011), http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2011/Why-Americans-Use-Social-Media.aspx.
3. See danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2008), available
at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00393.x/pdf (noting that
many users of social networks “integrated these sites into their daily practices”); see
also Global Audience Spends Two Hours More a Month on Social Networks than Last
Year, NIELSEN (Mar. 19, 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/global/global-audience-spends-two-hours-more-a-month-on-social-networks-than-last-year.html (detailing the results of a 2010 survey that indicated that across 10 countries, the average
Facebook user logged into the site 19 times per month, spending nearly 6 hours on the
site).
4. Katie Baker, Mark Zuckerberg’s 650 Million Friends (and Counting), NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE (Mar. 6, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://mag.newsweek.com/2011/03/06/
mark-zuckerberg-s-650-million-friends-and-counting.html. While Facebook is by far
the most popular social network website in the United States and in most countries,
some other social networks dominate particular countries’ markets, such as Orkut in
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receive upwards of 500 million site visits a day.5
Social network websites differ from other kinds of websites for two
main reasons. First, the user experience on a social networking website is
oriented towards connections with other users. All social network websites “allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile
within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom
they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system.”6 Second, social network websites allow their users to message one another and share online
content with other users to whom they are connected, typically through
public commenting tools and stream-based updates.7 As one federal court
has noted, social network websites “exist[ ] because [their] users want to
share information—often about themselves—and to obtain information
about others, within and among groups and subgroups of persons they
already know or with whom they become acquainted through using [social network websites].”8 Aside from personal information, users of social
networking websites may also share music, images, videos, and links to
other websites.9
Relationship-focused social network websites, such as Facebook,
have a third distinguishing characteristic: they support pre-existing, socalled real-world social relationships.10 While some relationship-focused
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Brazil, Ozone and Renren in China, Mixi in Japan, Cyworld in Korea, VKontakte and
Odnoklassniki in Russia, and Zing in Vietnam. Id.
5. Nathan Olivarez-Giles, Facebook F8: Redesigning and hitting 800 million
users, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2011, 2:55 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2011/09/facebook-f8-media-features.html.
6. See danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2008), available
at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2007.00393.x/pdf. Individual
social network websites may vary considerably in terms of “visibility and access” as
well as “their features and user base,” but all share this common trait. Id. at 213–14.
7. danah m. boyd, Social Network Sites as Networked Publics: Affordances, Dynamics, and Implications, in A NETWORKED SELF: IDENTITY, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE ON SOCIAL NETWORK SITES 39, 43 (Zizi Papacharissi ed., 2011).
8. Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see also
James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1152–60 (2009) (explaining that Facebook enables its members to present an image of themselves to the
world, to deepen their relationships with others, to establish their social position, and
to build social capital).
9. See boyd & Ellison, supra note 6.
10. See id. at 221 (“[T]he available research suggests that most [social network
websites] primarily support pre-existing social relations.”); see also Andreas Wimmer
& Kevin Lewis, Beyond and Below Racial Homophily: ERG Models of a Friendship
Network Documented on Facebook, 116 AM. J. SOC. 583, 603 (2010) (noting that “pic-
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social network websites do exist primarily to help strangers connect based
on shared interests, for the most part users of these websites are connected to people who are already part of their extended social network.11
These unique features have enabled social network websites to become part of the fabric of social life for hundreds of millions of people
around the world. Social network websites have transformed how individuals communicate, how authorities govern,12 and how companies sell their
goods and services. Social network websites serve a variety of purposes:
parents use Facebook to vet nannies; police, to keep tabs on suspects; and
even federal government authorities, to prepare for natural disasters.13
Just as social network websites have transformed our social lives, so
too have they transformed politics. In both the United States and abroad,
social network websites have become an important tool for political
campaigning, mobilizing protests, political expression, and debate. Several American politicians—including Barack Obama, Sarah Palin, and
Scott Brown—extensively used social network websites during recent
campaigns.14 As Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign demonstrated, social network websites allow politicians to communicate with
millions of their supporters within a single day and enable their supporters to connect with each other and online groups, which can be used to
help plan rallies or support get-out-the-vote efforts.15 Individual citizens
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tures on Facebook represent and document, on the aggregate, ‘real life’ relationships
that are socially meaningful. . . .”).
11. See boyd & Ellison, supra note 6, at 221; Smith, supra note 2 (“Roughly two
thirds of social media users say that staying in touch with current friends and family
members is a major reason they use these sites, while half say that connecting with old
friends they’ve lost touch with is a major reason behind their use of these
technologies.”).
12. The Obama White House maintains a Twitter feed, and at least thirty government agencies communicate to the public through Facebook and other social network
websites. See Michael Sherer, Obama and Twitter: White House Social-Networking,
TIME (May 6, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1896482,00.html.
13. Somini Sengupta, Half of America Is Using Social Networks, N.Y. TIMES BITS
(Aug. 26, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/26/half-of-america-isusing-social-networks/.
14. See DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT 293–94 (2010) (“Barack
Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign used Facebook masterfully.”). See generally
TECHNO POLITICS IN PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNING (John Allen Hendricks & Lynda
Lee Kaid eds., 2011) (discussing use of new social media to reach voters).
15. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 14, at 293 (noting that the 2008 Obama campaign had “a large Facebook page, which gathered millions of fans during the campaign,” and also that “local and regional Obama campaigns invited supporters to join
their own Facebook groups, which allowed them to mobilize local supporters en
masse.”). Google has also pitched its social networking website, Google+, at politicians, explaining on one promotional webpage how the site’s features can be of use to
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and groups, meanwhile, have also used social network sites to mobilize
political support. For example, in the United States social network websites have played an important role in the Occupy Movement, which “began as a Twitter experiment.”16 Occupy’s supporters have used Facebook,
Tumblr, Twitter, and YouTube to mobilize support and organize protests.
At its height, the movement counted more than 400 Facebook pages with
2.7 million fans around the world, as well as over 100 Twitter accounts
with tens of thousands of followers.17
Looking outside the United States brings social network websites’
potential as a tool for political mobilization into even sharper relief. For
example, social network websites played a key role in the Arab Spring,
helping citizens to organize protests and circumvent state censorship in
such countries as Iran,18 Tunisia,19 and Egypt.20 Facebook has also become
a force for political mobilization in Latin America. In 2008, activists in
Colombia used Facebook to organize marches against the paramilitary
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them. See Google+ Politics, GOOGLE+, https://www.google.com/+/learnmore/politics/
index.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
16. Jennifer Preston, Protesters Look for Ways to Feed the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
25, 2011, at A28; see also Ben Berkowitz, From a Single Hashtag, a Protest Circled the
World, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2011, 4:54 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/17/
us-wallstreet-protests-social-idUSTRE79G6E420111017.
17. Preston, supra note 16; see also Alysia Santo, Occupy Wall Street’s Media
Team, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 7, 2011, 11:57 AM), http://www.cjr.org/the_
news_frontier/occupy_wall_streets_media_team.php?page=all (explaining that Occupy website gets 500,000 “hits” per day).
18. Rebecca Santana, Iran Election, Uprising Tracked on Twitter as Government
Censors Media, HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2009, 9:36 PM), http://www.huffing
tonpost.com/2009/06/15/iran-election-uprising-tr_n_215914.html (noting how supporters of Iranian presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi and the Green Movement
used Twitter to communicate and organize in light of government censorship of the
traditional media).
19. See Ethan Zuckerman, What if Tunisia Had a Revolution, But Nobody
Watched?, MY HEART’S IN ACCRA (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/
blog/2011/01/12/what-if-tunisia-had-a-revolution-but-nobody-watched/ (noting that
during the 2011 Tunisian Revolution many Tunisians “turn[ed] to YouTube and
DailyMotion videos, to blogs, Twitter and especially Facebook” to keep up-to-date on
the news in their country); Kristen McTighe, A Blogger at Arab Spring’s Genesis, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/13/world/africa/a-blogger-atarab-springs-genesis.html (noting that “protesters were able to break the media blackout by spreading video, information and commentary through the Internet and social
media operations”).
20. Mike Giglio, The Facebook Freedom Fighter, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 21, 2011, at 14,
available at http://mag.newsweek.com/2011/02/13/the-facebook-freedom-fighter.html;
see also Charles Levinson & Margaret Coker, Turmoil in Egypt: The Secret Rally That
Sparked an Uprising, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2011, at A9 (protesters announced demonstration locations on internet).

33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 68 Side B

02/06/2014 10:11:19

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-1\NMX104.txt

126

unknown

Seq: 6

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

4-FEB-14

13:06

[Vol. 44

organization FARC that drew 10 million participants in Colombia and 2
million more worldwide,21 and in 2011 thousands of young Nicaraguans
used Facebook to protest the re-election bid of Nicaraguan President
Daniel Ortega.22
Aside from their use as a campaigning and mobilization tool, social
network websites have also become prominent forums for political expression and debate. The United States’ military action in Libya was the
ninth most-talked about topic on Facebook in 2011 (though most of the
other top ten topics, such as the Packers’ Super Bowl win and the death
of Steve Jobs, were anything but political),23 and YouTube’s homepage
lists “News & Politics” and “Nonprofits & Activism” as two of its eighteen primary video channels.24 No doubt many readers of this article have
personal experience with political statements by friends in their Facebook
news feed.
Of course, the role of social network websites in politics should not
be overstated, as several participants in social media-fueled protest movements have noted. Social network websites are at best one campaigning
tool in a set of many, and no online protest can yet replace the importance of boots on the ground25 or eliminate the necessity, at times, of oldfashioned political communication tactics like distributing fliers and doorto-door advocacy.26 The fact remains, though, that social network websites have clearly become a powerful tool for political mobilization and
organization, as well as an important forum for political speech and debate around the globe.
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21. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 14, at 4.
22. Tim Rogers, Mideast Unrest Spreads to Nicaragua — Virtually, TIME (Feb. 26,
2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2055679,00.html.
23. Jonathan Chang, Like My Status: Memology 2011, FACEBOOK (Dec. 6, 2011,
9:01 PM), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/like-my-status-memology-2011/
10150391956652131.
24. YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/channels (last visited Oct. 12, 2013)
(“Causes & Non-profits” and “News & Politics” listed among top video channels).
25. See, e.g., Preston, supra note 16 (noting that many Occupy Wall Street organizers and social media experts have stated that while the online component to the
protests was critical, the protest movement was unsustainable without a physical
presence).
26. While social network websites undoubtedly played a key role in organizing
protests during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, protest organizers also made distributing fliers in working-class districts of Cairo a key element of their publicity strategy, as
the internet and Facebook were not as widely used in those districts. Levinson &
Coker, supra note 20.
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B. The Threat of Censorship on Social Network Websites
Most of the major social network websites have publicly committed
themselves to the ideals of openness and transparency. Twitter has committed itself to “the open exchange of information.”27 Facebook also says
that its “mission is to give people the power to share and make the world
more open and connected,”28 which it claims will “create greater understanding”29 and decrease violent conflict throughout the world.30 But even
if one grants that social network websites have a good track record thus
far, it does not then follow that one should blindly trust them—they are,
after all, for-profit companies that pursue their own financial interests.
Despite their ostensible commitments to openness and the free exchange
of ideas, social network websites face external and internal pressures to
censor content or block particular users’ access, a troubling situation
given the importance social network websites have assumed in contemporary social and political life.
1. External Pressures to Engage in Censorship
External pressures on social network websites to censor content or
block access are most obvious in repressive and authoritarian regimes,
particularly those that are run by a Communist party or a theocracy:31
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27. Transparency Report, TWITTER, https://transparency.twitter.com (last visited
Dec. 13, 2013).
28. Facebook—Info, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info
(last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
29. Facebook Principles, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/principles.php
(last visited Dec. 13, 2013). Facebook has also identified “Freedom to Share and Connect,” “Free Flow of Information,” and “Fundamental Equality” as some of its ten
core principles. Id. Myspace, however, has made no such commitments, conceiving of
itself primarily as a method to “[d]iscover, share and connect” to music, design and
culture rather than a force for political or societal good. See Learn More, MYSPACE,
https://myspace.com/learnmore (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
30. See Peace on Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://peace.facebook.com/ (last visited
Dec. 13, 2013) (aimed at decreasing world conflict through facilitating connections
between individuals from diverse backgrounds). Such lofty aspirations may not be as
far-fetched as they might at first seem, as the technologies that have made ideas and
people increasingly mobile and that make people aware of the perspectives of other
individuals who are unlike themselves may be a major factor in recent declines in
intrastate violence and interstate war. See STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF
OUR NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED (2011). Critics of technological determinism, however, might oppose this claim.
31. Some repressive regimes, however, in apparent recognition of the maxim “if
you cannot beat them, join them,” have instead turned to social network websites to
keep tabs on their political opponents. For instance, several commentators have speculated that the now-deposed Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s decision to
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China has blocked Facebook entirely since 200932 and also blocks Twitter;33 Vietnam has also taken steps to block Facebook;34 and Iranian authorities are so fearful of the use of social network websites as an
organizing tool that they will go to great lengths to put a stop to any
gatherings organized on social networks, including water gun fights.35
Democracies have seen their fair share of such pressure as well. India’s government, for example, has recently made several pushes to censor content on social network websites, calling on social media websites
to censor content if individuals formally complain that the content is “disparaging” or “harassing,” or if it offends the cultural “sensibilities” of
Indian people.36 The United States has also witnessed governmental and
political pressure to censor content on social network websites. In the
wake of WikiLeaks’ release of classified United States diplomatic cables,
the Department of Justice obtained a court order for Twitter to turn over
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open up Tunisia to Facebook subsequent to his initial decision to block the site was
made in the hopes of “us[ing] that openness to keep tabs on those who were using
Facebook and Twitter to communicate and organize.” McTighe, supra note 19. Similarly, the late Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chavez encouraged citizens to denounce
enemies of his Bolivarian movement on Twitter. Mac Margolis & Alex Marin, Twitter
a Tool for Spies, NEWSWEEK (International Edition), June 14, 2010, available at http://
mag.newsweek.com/2010/06/07/twitter-a-tool-for-spies.html. These developments
have led some commentators to conclude that the rise of communications on social
network websites is just as likely to undermine democracy and prop up authoritarian
regimes as it is to promote democracy and freedom. See generally EVGENY
MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET FREEDOM (2011)
(discussing potential dangers of the internet and social media negatively impacting
global democracy).
32. Loretta Chao, Mr. Zuckerberg Goes to China, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2010, at
B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870381480457603
5143409583806.
33. Evelyn M. Rusli & Mark Scott, Saudi Prince Invests $300 Million in Twitter,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Dec. 19, 2011, 5:13 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/
12/19/saudi-prince-invests-300-million-in-twitter/.
34. Ben Stocking, Vietnam Internet Users Fear Facebook Blackout, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, (Nov. 17, 2009), http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-technology/vietnam-internet-users-fear-facebook-blackout-20091117-iki0.html.
35. Farnaz Fassihi, Iran’s Wet Blankets Put a Damper on Water-Park Fun, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 31, 2011, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB
10001424053111904823804576502342250845116.
36. See Heather Timmons, ‘Chilling’ Impact of India’s April Internet Rules, N.Y.
TIMES INDIA INK (Dec. 7, 2011, 4:39 AM), http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/07/
chilling-impact-of-indias-april-internet-rules/; Heather Timmons, ‘Any Normal
Human Being Would be Offended’, N.Y. TIMES INDIA INK (Dec. 6, 2011, 7:35 AM),
http://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/any-normal-human-being-would-be-offend
ed/.
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information about its WikiLeaks-related accounts,37 which, while not censorship itself, assumedly had a chilling effect on WikiLeaks-related
tweets.38 Twitter has also faced challenges from Senator Joe Lieberman,
who led an effort to have Twitter block pro-Taliban accounts and
messages.39 YouTube has faced challenges from Senator Lieberman, Representative Anthony Weiner (who perhaps had good reason to fear social
network websites40), and British security minister Pauline Neville-Jones,
who called for YouTube to remove a long list of pro-terrorism videos.41
School districts around the United States have also taken steps to limit
the kinds of communications that students and teachers may engage in on
social network websites.42
2. Internal Pressures to Engage in Censorship
Social network websites also face internal pressures to censor their
content or block particular users’ access. Certain forms of such censorship
may serve several legitimate and largely apolitical ends, while only minimally affecting legitimate First Amendment interests. First, social network websites may censor communications in order to prevent convicted
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37. See Paul Sonne, U.S. Presses Twitter for Data on WikiLeaks, WALL ST. J., Jan.
10, 2011, at A13, available at, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748
704482704576072081788251562.
38. Twitter eventually won a motion to lift the order. Jerry Brito, First Privacy,
Now Censorship: Will Twitter Continue to Stand Up for Its Users’ Rights?, TIME (Jan.
2, 2012), http://techland.time.com/2012/01/02/privacy-and-censorship-will-twitter-continue-to-stand-up-for-its-users-rights-this-year/.
39. Id.
40. Weiner was forced to resign from Congress after he was caught sending lewd
photos of himself to a young woman through his Twitter account. See Editorial,
Anthony Weiner Resigns, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2011, at A34, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/06/17/opinion/17fri4.html; Devlin Barrett, Weiner Fails to Quell
Controversy Over Photo, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2011, at A6, available at http://online.
wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304563104576359970261287018.
41. YouTube initially complied with the politicians’ demands but ultimately backtracked and decided not to guarantee that such videos would be screened out. See
Brian Bennett, YouTube Is Letting Users Decide on Terrorism-Related Videos, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 12, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/12/nation/la-na-youtubeterror-20101213.
42. See Jennifer Preston, Rules to Stop Pupil and Teacher From Getting Too Social Online, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2011, at A1, available at, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/12/18/business/media/rules-to-limit-how-teachers-and-students-interact-online.
html (noting that school districts are “imposing strict new guidelines that ban private
conversations between teachers and their students on cellphones and online platforms
like Facebook and Twitter”).
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criminals from preying on victims, accusers, or witnesses,43 or to prevent
certain users from harassing or intimidating other users.44 Second, the
censorship of pornographic or violent materials may help to create and
maintain an environment acceptable to users of as many ages and sensibilities as possible, thereby broadening the site’s ability to serve as a forum for public communications and discourse, and increasing its value to
advertisers.45 Third, such censorship may be necessary to prevent harm to
the website due to hacking and phishing attacks.46 Fourth, such censorship
may be necessary to comply with copyright and trademark laws and laws
governing publicity.47 Such censorship does, of course, have the potential
to be abused or to be applied overinclusively, but one would think that a
certain amount of these kinds of censorship is necessary to maintaining
the atmosphere that attracts users to such sites in the first place.48
However, social network websites might censor content for more
troubling reasons. For example, they might discriminate against view-
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43. See Inmates Using Facebook, Cell Phones to Harass Their Victims, Accusers,
Witnesses, C.B.S. NEWS (Nov. 21, 2011, 11:45 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301504083_162-57328739-504083/inmates-using-facebook-cell-phones-to-harass-their-victims-accusers-witnesses/; Meg Handley, How Prisoners Harass Their Victims Using
Facebook, TIME (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,
1964916,00.html. Additionally, convicted sex offenders are forbidden from using
Facebook. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Apr. 26, 2011), http://
www.facebook.com/legal/terms?ref=pf [hereinafter FACEBOOK, Statement].
44. Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, for example, asks users
not to “bully, intimidate, or harass any user” or post content that is “hateful” or
“threatening.” FACEBOOK, Statement, supra note 43.
45. Facebook asks users not to post “pornographic” materials, or those which “incite[ ] violence” or “contain[ ] nudity or graphic or gratuitous violence.” Id. YouTube
similarly censors pornographic and obscene content, and reserves the right to “at any
time, without prior notice and in its sole discretion, remove such content and/or terminate a user’s account for submitting such material in violation” of YouTube’s terms of
service. Terms of Service, YOUTUBE (June 9, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/t/terms.
46. See Tom Loftus, Facebook Slammed by Porn Attack, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16,
2011, at B4 (noting that Facebook suffered a “coordinated spam attack” that resulted
in the posting of pornographic and violent images on users’ news feeds); Claire Suddath, The Downside of Friends: Facebook’s Hacking Problem, TIME (May 5, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1895740,00.html (noting that in
recent years, Facebook has suffered upwards of 4,500 hacking and phishing attacks
per year).
47. See PAUL D. MCGRADY, JR., MCGRADY ON SOCIAL MEDIA § 1.03 (2011).
48. Cf. Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 62 (2009)
(arguing that civil rights lawsuits against speech on social network websites that attacks “women, people of color, and members of other traditionally disadvantaged
classes” promote rather than undermine First Amendment values because they
“help[] preserve vibrant online dialogue and promote a culture of political, social, and
economic equality”).
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points on matters of public concern that interfere with their business interests,49 filtering out viewpoints that are critical of their business
practices or those of their partners, or that they think will offend and
scare away certain users or business partners. They might also suppress
statements that they believe could wrongly be attributed to the social network website itself.50 Further, social network websites might censor content in order to promote specific political agendas or in response to
political pressure from certain sets of users. For example, Myspace twice
deleted its 35,000-member “Atheist and Agnostic Group,” the first time
after an organized campaign from conservative Christian users who opposed the group, and the second time following an attack by Christian
hackers who deleted the group’s material and renamed it “Jesus is
Love.”51 This incident serves as an example of how social network websites can be used to impair individuals’ ability to freely express themselves and associate online.
3. The Potential Effects of Censorship on Users of Social Network
Websites
Why should we care about censorship on social network websites?
After all, even if such censorship seems likely to occur sooner or later,
social network websites are privately owned and exist primarily to earn a
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49. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22 (2004) (arguing that “businesses that control telecommunications networks will seek to limit forms
of participation and cultural innovation that are inconsistent with their economic interests”) [hereinafter Balkin, Digital Speech]; Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Sidewalks, Sewers, and State Action in Cyberspace, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/is02/
readings/stateaction-shaffer-van-houweling.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2013) (expressing the fear that “ISPs who face only limited competition will prevent their subscribers from easily accessing Internet content that competes with content offered by the
ISP or its corporate affiliates, or content that is critical of them”).
50. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, Virtual Liberty: Freedom to Design and Freedom to Play in
Virtual Worlds, 90 VA. L. REV. 2043, 2093 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Virtual Liberty]
(arguing that owners of virtual worlds “have countervailing incentives to (1) censor
speech critical of how the owner is running the space; (2) censor speech it thinks will
offend and hence scare customers away; and (3) censor speech that it believe customers will (fairly or unfairly) associate with the game owner or blame the game owner
for allowing in the space”).
51. David Briggs, MySpace Deletes Site for Atheists, Founder Says, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 31, 2008, at E1. Myspace later restored the group without
public comment, but banned several of the previously regular contributors from joining the group. MySpace Atheist and Agnostic Group Restored (Sort Of), SECULAR
STUDENT ALLIANCE (Feb. 2, 2008, 9:41 PM), http://www.secularstudents.org/node/
1942.
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profit. One could argue that any beneficial social effects of the sites are at
most a subsidiary consideration for their owners.
There are three reasons that censorship of communications on social
network websites should make us seriously worried. First, individual
speakers whose messages have been censored on a dominant social network website may lack a meaningful alternative venue for their communications. Social network websites have diminished the importance and
the effectiveness of traditional physical venues for speech, like public
parks, as well as traditional forms of political communication, such as
pamphlets and fliers. At the same time, an individual shut out of a dominant social network website may have no comparable alternative social
network in which to express their views. This is the case because social
network websites are characterized by network effects: the more users a
social network website has, the more valuable that website becomes to its
users.52 These network effects “often lead to an equilibrium in which a
single firm or product dominates an industry segment,”53 which means
one major relationship-focused social network website will typically dominate in a given country.54 In other words, not all social network websites
are created equal, and being shut out of a dominant one could drastically
reduce the size of the online audience for a speaker’s message (perhaps
to the point where it is practically nonexistent).55 Further, users may hesitate to provoke the ire of a particularly dominant relationship-focused
social network website such as Facebook due to a fear of losing access to
an important means of communication, as well as the many digital mementos of their social life stored by that social network website.56 Net-
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52. See generally Arun Sundararajan, Network Effects, http://oz.stern.nyu.edu/io/
network.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2012). Websites are also generally characterized by
power laws, which even aside from network effects means that “the top 20% of web
sites get about two-thirds of all web hits.” M.E.J. Newman, Power Laws, Pareto Distributions and Zipf’s Law, 46 CONTEMP. PHYSICS 323, 334 (2005).
53. Sundararajan, supra note 52.
54. See Baker, supra note 4.
55. Even if an alternative social network website is available, the costs of switching from one social network website to another may nevertheless be exceedingly high.
Cf. Eric Goldman, Speech Showdowns at the Virtual Corral, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 845, 850 (2005) (discussing the costs of switching between
competing virtual world websites).
56. See Dan Fletcher, How Facebook is Redefining Privacy, TIME (May 20, 2010),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1990798,00.html (noting how
when the author’s account was deactivated by Facebook for violating the rules of the
site, he lost “all [his] photos, all [his] messages and all [his] status updates from [his]
senior year of high school through the first two years of college,” erasing years of
“digital mementos” that he “still miss[es]”).
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work effects thus heighten the likelihood that censorial acts by social
network websites will have chilling effects on expression.
Second, networks tend to organize themselves around certain particularly well-connected nodes. When the operator of a social network censors the communications of a user or group representing such a node, it
could have a devastating impact on a particular message or form of communication.57 Nodal organization also makes it easier to identify individuals belonging to a particular group, making it easier to harass them and
prospectively censor their speech.
Third, political commitments on social network websites are often
very public. Saying something on a political subject in anything other
than a private message on a social network website necessarily involves
exposing one’s views to other people—as one commentator has noted,
“[j]oining a protest group on Facebook is unlike standing in a crowd and
holding up a sign at a protest. It may be easier to do in terms of convenience, but it is a more public commitment. It’s more like signing a petition with our name and address in a way that many others can
immediately see.”58 Social network websites and individuals who have access to them typically possess an extraordinary ability to personally identify supporters of particular messages and viewpoints.59 This could make
cooperation between social network websites and government or political
actors to censor content especially dangerous, as it raises the possibility of
online censorship translating into offline harassment or intimidation.60
In sum, the threat of censorship on social network websites is real:
social network websites face numerous pressures, both external and internal, to abridge the ability of particular users and groups to espouse certain political viewpoints on their websites, and such censorship can easily

R
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57. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN 226 (2007) (“Networks have
a natural tendency to organize themselves around an extremely concentrated architecture: a few nodes are extremely connected; others barely so. . . . This seems to
make networks more robust: random insults to most parts of the network will not be
consequential since they are likely to hit a poorly connected spot. But it also makes
networks more vulnerable. . . . Just consider what would happen if there is a problem
with a major node.”).
58. See KIRKPATRICK, supra note 14, at 288.
59. Social network websites typically possess personal information on individual
users at a very granular level. See Fletcher, supra note 56. Facebook has even developed technology that can recognize individual users’ faces in photographs posted on
its website. Geoffrey A. Fowler & Christopher Lawton, Facebook Again in Spotlight
on Privacy, WALL ST. J., June 8, 2011, at B1.
60. These characteristics distinguish social network websites from the rest of the
internet, which is generally characterized by relative anonymity, decentralized distribution, multiple points of access, and no simple system for linking content to realworld people or places. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 236 (2006).
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lead to important real-world consequences. It is frightening to imagine
that the great power wielded by these websites could go largely
unchecked.
II. EXTENDING FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY TO THE
ACTIONS OF SOCIAL NETWORK WEBSITES
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Y K
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61. This Article will not take a stance on what level of scrutiny is appropriate for
assessing the constitutionality of content-based restrictions on communications on social network websites, leaving this fascinating topic to be addressed by future articles.
As established, social network websites may have several legitimate reasons for engaging in content-based discrimination. See supra Part I.B. Some might argue that this
militates toward applying some form of intermediate scrutiny to content-based restrictions on communications on social network websites; others might argue that this
merely means that when strict scrutiny is applied it will be relatively easy to establish
that such restrictions serve a compelling interest. For an example of what such a discussion might look like, see Peter Swire, Social Networks, Privacy, and Freedom of
Association: Data Protection vs. Data Empowerment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1371 (2011–12)
(detailing several different possible approaches to the level of scrutiny to be applied
to the regulation of privacy on social network websites).
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If a governmental actor, such as Congress, a federal agency, or a
state government, were to directly censor content on a social network
website, or if they were to coerce an operator of a social network website
into doing so, this censorial act would be subject to First Amendment
scrutiny. But what happens when an operator of a social network website
acts to censor content on its own? This Part argues that, in light of the
importance of social network websites in modern social and political life,
and in light of the fact that protecting communications on social network
websites would promote core First Amendment values, courts can and
should hold that censorial acts by social network websites are state action
subject to First Amendment scrutiny.61
This Part begins by setting aside the threshold issue of state action
to argue that protecting communications on social network websites
would promote core First Amendment values, as communications on social network websites simultaneously invoke the three First Amendment
freedoms of speech, press, and association. Some might argue that conducting this First Amendment analysis before the threshold state action
analysis gets things backwards, but that is precisely the point: to show
how a narrow and formalist construction of the state action doctrine
could prevent the protection of communications that so vigorously embody First Amendment values.
This Part will then explore how the public function exception to the
state action doctrine can allow First Amendment scrutiny to be extended

33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 73 Side A

02/06/2014 10:11:19

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-1\NMX104.txt

Spring 2014]

unknown

Seq: 15

CENSORSHIP AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

4-FEB-14

13:06

135

to the conduct of social network websites. This Part will then show how a
consideration of the spaces that the Court has protected under the public
forum doctrine further bolsters this conclusion. Then, this Part will
demonstrate how the entwinement exception to the state action doctrine
could also protect against certain instances of censorship by social network websites. Lastly, this Part will explain why courts may nevertheless
be disinclined to hold social network websites to be state actors.
A. The Basic Case for First Amendment Protections
Public communications by users of social network websites deserve
First Amendment protection because they simultaneously invoke three of
the interests protected by the First Amendment: freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of association.
1. Freedom of Speech on Social Network Websites
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62. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
63. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
64. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
65. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
66. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
67. Although few cases have yet addressed this issue, the Eastern District of Arkansas recently found that an individual’s Facebook status updates were protected
speech that touched on a matter of public concern. Mattingly v. Milligan, No.
4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283, at *4 (E.D. Ark., Nov. 1, 2011). The Eastern
District of Virginia, however, concluded that “liking” a Facebook page was not constitutionally protected speech because it did not involve the making of “actual statements.” Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (E.D. Va. 2012).
68. Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 385-86 (4th Cir. 2013).
69. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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With respect to freedom of speech, the Court has read the First
Amendment’s textual reference to “speech” quite broadly to cover a
wide range of expressive activities; even such expressive nonverbal conduct as sleeping in a park,62 wearing a black armband,63 burning a military
draft card,64 burning an American flag,65 and burning a large cross66 may
trigger some form of First Amendment scrutiny. Since communications
on social network websites can mimic traditional modes of speech such as
public speaking and pamphleteering even more closely than these already-protected expressive activities, they almost certainly merit protection under the First Amendment’s Speech Clause.67 Indeed, for similar
reasons the Fourth Circuit recently held that clicking the “like” button on
Facebook is protected speech.68
Further, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Reno v. ACLU69 supports treating communications on social network websites as constitution-
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ally protected speech. In Reno, the Court stated that there is “no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied
to [the internet],” since “[t]hrough the use of chat rooms, any person with
a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soapbox,” and since “[t]hrough the use of Web
pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a
pamphleteer.”70 Although the Court’s references to these relics of an internet era long since passed might now strike us as rather quaint, the
Court’s reasoning applies with equal force to communications on social
network websites, which, like chat rooms, involve public statements; like
mail exploders, can reach many individuals at the same time; and like
newsgroups, involve messages broadcast primarily to those individuals
who are connected to the speaker through the network on which it is
published. Further, political communications on social network websites
also appear to merit especially strong First Amendment protection, as
political speech lies at the heart of the First Amendment’s protections,71
and the Court has “decline[d] to draw . . . constitutional lines based on
the particular media or technology used to disseminate political speech
from a particular speaker.”72 Therefore, so long as communications on
social network websites do not fall within a category of speech that is
traditionally unprotected by the First Amendment,73 they merit protection under the Speech Clause.
2. Freedom of the Press on Social Network Websites

C M
Y K

R

02/06/2014 10:11:19

70. Id. at 870. Despite the Reno Court’s articulation of a broad rationale for protecting internet speech, the Court took a contextual approach to internet speech that
carefully considered the extent to which less restrictive alternatives were available as
well as the scope of the statutory language at issue in the case. See id.; see also DANIEL
A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 222 (3d ed. 2010).
71. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806,
2816–17 (2011); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339–40
(2010).
72. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 326.
73. Some categories of unprotected speech are incitement to violence, libel, obscenity, fighting words, and commercial advertising. FARBER, supra note 70, at 13.
Speech falling within these categories is only unprotected to some degree, of course—
for each category, the Court has created rules detailing the boundaries of permissible
government regulation. Id.
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Public communications on social network websites are also similar
to traditional publishing and deserve similar protection under the Press
Clause of the First Amendment. Issuing a public communication on a social network website involves the dissemination of a written message to
several different individuals simultaneously, much like the publication of
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a free newspaper or newsletter. Public communications on social network
websites also often serve the same social role as newspapers and other
forms of traditional print media, namely keeping readers up-to-date on
current events and politics. The Press Clause’s limited protections for
publishers74 should therefore also extend to some degree to users of social
network websites when they are issuing public communications.
3. Freedom of Association on Social Network Websites
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74. For example, the Press Clause specifies that publishers may not be singled out
for special burdens. FARBER, supra note 70, at 207. The enforcement against publishers of a general law that burdens speech is not subject to stricter First Amendment
scrutiny than that which would be applied to the enforcement of the law against other
persons or organizations. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–70
(1991).
75. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
76. Id. at 617–18.
77. Id. at 619–20.
78. Id. at 620.
79. Id.
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A strong case can also be made that the First Amendment right to
associate protects public communications on social network websites. Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Roberts v. United States Jaycees75 distinguished two different features of the First Amendment right to
associate: the “intrinsic” feature and the “instrumental” feature. The “intrinsic” feature of the right to associate establishes that “choices to enter
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured
against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.”76
The “personal affiliations that exemplify” this intrinsic feature of the
right to associate are those “that attend the creation and sustenance of a
family,” which involve “deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively
personal aspects of one’s life.”77 Additionally, families are characterized
by “relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin
and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects
of the relationship.”78 Thus, “[d]etermining the limits of state authority
over an individual’s freedom to enter into a particular association therefore unavoidably entails a careful assessment of where that relationship’s
objective characteristics locate it on a spectrum from the most intimate to
the most attenuated of personal attachments.”79 The Jaycees failed to
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Id. at 620–21.
Id. at 618.
Id. at 622.
Id.
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80.
81.
82.
83.
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qualify because membership in their organization was, for the most part,
unselective, and their national organization was largely impersonal.80
The “instrumental” feature of the right to associate, meanwhile, exists “for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First
Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances,
and the exercise of religion.”81 In these cases, the Court has recognized a
right to “associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political,
social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”82 This right
was “plainly implicated” in the Jaycees’ case.83
Communications on social network websites can invoke both of
these features of the right to associate. With respect to the intrinsic feature of the right to associate, it is clear that in some instances such communications represent the sharing (or, as any Facebook user can attest is
often the case, over-sharing) of thoughts, experiences, beliefs, and the
distinctively personal aspects of one’s life with a select group of other
users with whom the individual is connected. When an individual chooses
to invite another individual to be their friend on Facebook, the former is
inviting the latter to associate with them through the sharing of public or
semi-public messages, such as Facebook timeline posts, private messages,
photos, music, or videos. Though such a relationship is surely more impersonal than the familial relations at the far end of Justice Brennan’s
spectrum, it certainly involves a significantly greater degree of intimacy
than membership in a large organization like the Jaycees. Some communications on social network websites therefore display the distinctive
characteristics of those activities that are protected by the intrinsic feature of the right to associate.
Where communications on social network websites do not represent
the sharing of private thoughts or musings with one’s intimate friends or
less-than-intimate acquaintances, they might take the form of supporting
the aims of a particular political or religious group, or of mobilizing or
coordinating group action. For instance, a political group might try to
rally or mobilize its supporters through its Facebook page, and it might
communicate with them through private messages. Members of the group
might also express support for the group on the group’s Facebook page,
or they might try to advance the group’s cause by posting supportive
statements on their timeline, such that the messages show up in other
users’ news feeds. Such communications would differ from pure speech in
that they involve coordinated action amongst numerous group members
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in support of a particular goal or set of goals. In this sense, these communications would invoke the instrumental feature of the right to associate,
just as the Jaycees’ message did.84 Thus, some individuals’ messages on
social network websites may be protected by the intrinsic feature of the
right to associate, whereas the instrumental feature of the right to associate may protect messages by groups, as well as speech in support of group
activities.
Public communications on social networks can therefore be seen as
simultaneously invoking three of the interests protected by the First
Amendment: freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of
association. Setting aside the threshold issue of state action, then, the case
for extending First Amendment protections to such communications appears at first glance to be quite strong. Despite this, such communications
will not be protected unless censorial acts by social network website operators can be conceived of as state action, an issue to which this article will
now turn.
B. The State Action Doctrine
The state action doctrine provides that only the acts of the government or those acting on its behalf are subject to constitutional scrutiny,
which ordinarily leaves nongovernmental85 conduct, like that of social
network websites, beyond the purview of the Constitution’s protections.86
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84. Operators of social network websites could try to argue that being forced to
serve as a forum for viewpoints with which they disagree violates their right to associate, citing such cases as Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group,
515 U.S. 557 (1995), and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). Communications on social network websites are easily distinguishable from those that take
place in the context of a parade or those that are made by the leaders of an organization, in that few would mistake such communications for the message of the operator
of the social network website itself; a reasonable reader would almost surely conclude
that such communications represent the viewpoint of the speaker only. Users of social
network websites appear much more intuitively analogous to “outsiders” than to
those who come onto the site to “become [a] member[ ]” of its “expressive association,” that is, who come onto the site in order to promote its messages and its overarching mission. Cf. Rumsfeld v. Forum For Academic Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47 (2006) (holding that a military recruiter’s presence on a law school campus
does not violate the law school’s right to associate).
85. This article takes the stance that the “private”/“public” distinction (which concerns the openness and accessibility of a given thing or space to the public at large)
and the “governmental”/“nongovernmental” distinction (which concerns the ownership of a space or the identity of an actor) are separate and distinct concepts, though it
bears mentioning that the imprecise use of these terms has caused much confusion
regarding the state action doctrine.
86. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519–21 (4th ed. 2011).
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The state action doctrine has a long constitutional pedigree, with its origins in Supreme Court decisions that followed on the heels of the passage
of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as United States v. Cruikshank,87 Virginia v. Rives,88 and The Civil Rights Cases.89 Although from the 1940s to
the 1960s the Court expanded the applicability of the Constitution to
nongovernmental conduct by adopting an expansive interpretation of the
state action doctrine, in part to aid the process of racial desegregation,
the Court has been narrowing the doctrine ever since through such cases
as Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.90 Thus, while the state action doctrine has been roundly and justly criticized on a number of grounds,91 it is
now a constitutional “commonplace”92 and “a central principle of constitutional law.”93
As social network websites are privately owned (as are nearly all
online forums for speech94), the state action doctrine may render their
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87. 92 U.S. 542, 554 (1875) (“The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from
depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; but this
adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as against another.”).
88. 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879) (“The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. . .all
have reference to State action exclusively, and not to any action of private
individuals.”).
89. 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883) (“[T]he prohibitions of the [Fourteenth Amendment] are
against state laws and acts done under state authority.”).
90. 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (stating that there is an “essential dichotomy . . .
between deprivation by the State, subject to [constitutional] scrutiny under its provisions, and private conduct . . . against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no
shield”); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 86, at 530 (describing the development of
the state action doctrine).
91. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 86, at 523–25 (arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment might be read as applying to government inaction in the face of private
rights violations as forcefully as it does to government action itself, and that the state
action doctrine “sacrifices individual freedom because it permits the violation of
rights” and because “[s]peech can be lost or chilled just as much through private sanctions as through public ones”); Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action
Debate: The Cultural Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to ‘Private’ Regulation,
71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 1267 (2000) (“the state action doctrine rests on the often
illusory hope that we can draw a clear and coherent line between what constitutes
public as opposed to private behavior”); Note, Developments in the Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1310–11 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s focus on who owns the space in which speech takes place as
opposed to the character and nature of that space has the perverse result of insulating
spaces widely perceived to be “public” in nature from constitutional scrutiny).
92. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1543 (6th ed. 2009).
93. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 86, at 521.
94. See DAWN NUNZIATO, VIRTUAL FREEDOM 49 (2009) (noting the “near-complete shift in cyberspace from public to private ownership of forums and conduits for
expression”); Berman, supra note 91, at 1305 (noting that on the internet “one uses
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actions immune to First Amendment scrutiny, despite the fact that they
are in many senses public spaces, and they have more power to censor
public communications than many governmental actors.95 Some might
welcome this situation. After all, subjecting social network website owners’ actions to constitutional scrutiny would necessarily restrict their
property rights, interfering with their ability to protect the website from
harm96 as well as their expressive marketing activities.97 One might also
prefer leaving decisions about what communications are permissible on
social network websites to the websites themselves, which generally have
clear and publicly announced policies on this issue, rather than leaving
such decisions to the ad hoc application of balancing tests by courts.98
These private property-based arguments are ultimately unconvincing in the case of social network websites. Subjecting social network websites to some degree of constitutional scrutiny is crucial given their
importance to contemporary social and political life, their unique characteristics, and their incentives for engaging in censorship. For one, social
network websites are not truly private property given their openness and
the role they now play in our society. Further, the fact that network effects often cause there to be only one dominant social network website of
a given type causes certain social network websites to have natural monopoly power, which may further justify restricting their private property
rights (as natural monopolists like common telecommunications carriers
are often subject to regulations relating to their public functions). Al-
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privately-owned browsers to access privately-owned online service providers, with
messages traveling over privately-owned routers to privately-owned web sites”).
95. Most scholars believe that the state action doctrine would serve to insulate
internet speech regulators from constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., NUNZIATO, supra
note 94, at 114; Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment in the
Age of Google, National Security, and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 153, 186 (2011) (“[I]n today’s dynamic world new technologies are replacing
traditional functions, such as mail delivery, with expansive communication platforms
not contemplated by traditional notions of exclusive state functions.”). One scholar
has gone so far as to suggest this may be true of social network websites as well. See
Swire, supra note 61.
96. Cf. NUNZIATO, supra note 94, at 102 (arguing that internet service providers
should not be conceptualized as state actors because of their unique needs with respect to protecting their property from harm).
97. Lawrence Lessig, however, has suggested that even if the First Amendment is
applied to virtual spaces, regulations of pornography and spam messages in those
spaces are likely to be held constitutional given the long history of such regulation in
physical spaces. See LESSIG, supra note 60, at 245–47.
98. Cf. Berman, supra note 91, at 1307 & n.171 (arguing that “applying the Constitution more broadly could result in a far greater number of legal disputes being
resolved through the ad hoc application of a vague balancing calculus”).
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though social network websites must retain a great degree of control over
their private property, this consideration merely argues in favor of applying a more deferential level of scrutiny to censorial acts by social network
websites—not for exempting them from constitutional scrutiny
altogether.
Courts can and should extend First Amendment scrutiny to the acts
of social network websites by invoking one of the exceptions to the state
action doctrine, under which acts by nongovernmental actors can be
found to be equivalent to state action for constitutional purposes.99 Although the Court has admitted that the “cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the state have not been a model of
consistency,”100 these cases can be grouped into two exceptions to the
state action doctrine: the “public function exception” and the “entwinement exception.”101
1. The Public Function Exception
Under the public function exception, “the exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State” constitutes
state action.102 The public function exception serves as a check against the
abuse of power by private companies and corporations, which have in
recent years assumed many of the powers and duties that have historically been the province of the state.103
Courts have thus far been hostile to claims that the acts of privately
owned internet companies constitute state action under the public function exception. The Third Circuit and two federal district courts have rejected the claim that America Online (AOL) is a state actor104 on the
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99. This argument assumes that the Bill of Rights is not merely a limit on government behavior, but also serves to affirmatively promote and effectuate our constitutional values. This article also assumes that social network websites can be held to be
state actors when engaging in censorship, while at the same time exempting them
from constitutional scrutiny outside of the First Amendment context. This is, of
course, a major assumption to make, and exploring its defensibility is beyond the
scope of this article.
100. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991).
101. The entwinement exception is also sometimes referred to as the “nexus”
exception.
102. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974) (citations omitted).
103. See Allison D. Garrett, The Corporation as Sovereign, 60 ME. L. REV. 129,
130–32, 141–63 (2008) (arguing that private companies now “act similarly to traditional nation–states in some ways. They have tremendous economic power, establish
security forces, engage in diplomatic, adjudicatory and ‘legislative’ activities, and influence monetary policy.”).
104. Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3rd Cir. 2003); Noah v. AOL
Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 546 (E.D. Va. 2003) (citing Green, 318 F.3d at
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grounds that AOL “exercises absolutely no powers which are in any way
the prerogative, let alone the exclusive prerogative, of the State,” and
AOL is “merely one of many private online companies which allow
[their] members access to the Internet. . . .”105 Federal district courts have
also rejected the claim that Sony’s PlayStation 3 Network is a state actor
on the grounds that it “serves solely as a forum for people to interact
subject to specific contractual terms” and exists primarily for entertainment purposes.106 They have also rejected the claim that a private domain
name registrant is a state actor on the grounds that both “the Internet”
and “registration of Internet domain names” are “by no stretch of the
imagination” traditional and exclusive public functions.107 However, social
network websites differ considerably from the websites and networks that
these courts have considered. Social network websites much more closely
resemble the public spaces the Supreme Court has chosen to protect in
both its public function exception and public forum doctrine jurisprudence, which this article will now consider in turn.
a. The Public Function Exception Generally
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472); see also Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 437
(E.D. Pa. 1996).
105. Cyber Promotions, 948 F. Supp at 441–42.
106. Estavillo v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am., No. C-09-03007 RMW, 2009 WL
3072887, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2009).
107. See Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 289, 306
(E.D.N.Y. 2000).
108. See generally Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
109. See id. at 503–504.
110. Id. at 509.
111. Id. at 503.
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The public function exception originates from the seminal case of
Marsh v. Alabama.108 In Marsh, a Jehovah’s Witness came onto the premises of a company–owned town and distributed religious literature against
the wishes of the town’s management, leading to a criminal conviction for
trespass.109 The Court reversed the conviction, holding that the private
property rights of the company did not “justify the State’s permitting a
corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties. . . .”110
The Court thus effectively treated the company-owned town like a
state actor. It based this holding on three rationales. First, the companyowned town was essentially no different from any other municipality “except [for] the fact that the title to the property belong[ed] to a private
corporation,”111 which implies that the company town had the power to
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undermine freedom as effectively as the state.112 Second, because the
town and its shopping district were accessible to and freely used by the
public in general, the town was undoubtedly serving a public function
akin to that traditionally exercised by the state.113 Third, holding the company-owned town constitutionally accountable would foster better democratic self-governance.114 In combination, these three rationales suggest
that the public function exception is rather expansive in scope.
Each of the Marsh Court’s rationales for the public function exception applies to social network websites. First, with respect to the power to
undermine freedom, social network websites enjoy more power to curb
individual freedom than small company-owned towns in Alabama—if it
wanted to, Facebook could severely curb the ability of over 800 million
users to espouse particular political messages to their friends and acquaintances. Second, with respect to openness, most social network websites are open to almost anyone willing to abide by their terms of
service.115 Third, with respect to self-governance, in our country social
network websites are important tools for political communication and
mobilization, as well as for communication between the government and
citizens.116 In sum, social network websites may be privately owned, but
they are sufficiently public, at least in the sense with which Marsh is concerned, in nature to be treated as state actors, and as they do some of the
things that governments do, they should be limited in some of the ways in
which governments are limited.
One could attempt to counter these arguments by pointing out that
social network websites do not perform core government functions like
operating public thoroughfares, parks, or police departments.117 But just
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112. STONE ET AL., supra note 92, at 1597.
113. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 503–506 (“The more an owner, for his advantage,
opens up his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become
circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”).
114. See id. at 508 (noting that “[m]any people in the United States live in company-owned towns,” that “[t]o act as good citizens they must be informed,” and that
therefore “[i]n order to enable them to be properly informed their information must
be uncensored”); see also NUNZIATO, supra note 94, at 52 (arguing that under Marsh
“the dispositive inquiry is whether the speech regulations by the powerful regulator at
issue interfere with the open channels of communication essential for individuals to
participate meaningfully in democratic self-government.”).
115. Such terms of service are admittedly speech-restricting.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 14–24.
117. An argument could be made that some social network websites do provide
such services, as they may maintain public infrastructure, provide for security, and
enforce property rights. Cf. Jason S. Zack, The Ultimate Company Town: Wading in
the Digital Marsh of Second Life, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225 (2007) (arguing for
extending the Marsh Court’s reasoning to Second Life, an online virtual world).
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because the performance of such functions is sufficient to satisfy the public function exception does not mean that it is necessary to do so. In
Marsh, it appears that it was not Gulf Shipbuilding’s maintenance of the
town’s sewer system that so troubled the Court, but rather its control of
who could speak on the town’s sidewalks.118 It would seem rather odd to
focus a First Amendment analysis on municipal services that have nothing to do with speech, and one would hope that the outcome in a case
involving a freedom of speech claim would not be “controlled by the absence of sewers in cyberspace.”119 Therefore, one can persuasively claim
that under Marsh, the acts of social network websites to censor speech
can be construed as state action under the public function exception.
Nevertheless, Marsh’s scope has been significantly narrowed by subsequent cases. In Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co.120 the Court held that the
exception only encompasses public functions that are both “traditionally”
and “exclusively” provided for by the State.121 Thus, under Jackson, the
actions of a private utility that enjoys a state-granted monopoly do not
constitute state action, because although governments have historically
run utilities, privately run utilities also commonly exist.122 In addition, although the Court extended the public function exception to privately
owned shopping centers in Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza,123 reasoning that shopping centers are open to the
public and functionally the same as the commercial center of a municipality,124 the Court quickly reversed course in Lloyd Corp. Ltd. v. Tanner125
and then formally overruled Logan Valley in Hudgens v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd.126 While the rationale for Marsh remains persuasive, it appears
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118. See Shaffer Van Houweling, supra note 49 (arguing that in Marsh “it was Gulf
Shipbuilding’s control of sidewalks—not sewers—that made the state’s trespass prosecution problematic”).
119. Id.
120. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
121. See id. at 352.
122. See id. at 357; see also Rendell–Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (reaffirming the importance of exclusivity to the public function exception, and stating that
the question is not just whether a party performs a public function but rather
“whether the function performed has been ‘traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the State.’ ” (citations omitted)).
123. 391 U.S. 308, 325 (1968) (holding that a privately owned shopping center
could not exclude striking laborers from picketing a store within the shopping center).
124. See id. at 317–19.
125. 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1968) (holding that a privately owned shopping center
could exclude anti–Vietnam War protesters from distributing literature on its premises). Some commentators believe the case is difficult to defend as a matter of constitutional doctrine. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 86, at 534.
126. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518–21 (1976).
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unlikely that the Court would extend the public function exception to
nongovernmental actors unless they perform core government functions
such as operating “bridges, ferries, turnpikes and railroads,”127 operating
a public park,128 or providing for “education, fire and police protection,
and tax collection.”129
Even this more narrow conception of the public function exception
can still permit social network websites to be viewed as state actors. Social network websites do serve an important public function: providing a
space that has the primary purpose of serving as a forum for public communication and expression,130 that is designated for that purpose, and that
is completely open to the public at large.131 In other words, social network
websites are like public squares and meeting places—indeed, one might
go so far as to say that social network websites are the town squares of
the twenty-first century—and they are both designed and designated for
this purpose, unlike the shopping malls in the Logan Valley line of cases,
which are first and foremost dedicated to shopping and commercial activity, and whose ability to serve as a forum for speech is merely incidental
to the design features required by a building that houses multiple retailers
in a relatively small space and seeks to provide a pleasurable windowshopping experience. Since managing public squares and meeting places
is something that has traditionally been done by the government, social
network websites therefore serve a public function that has traditionally
been the province of the state.
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127. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
128. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301–302 (1966) (operating a previously
public park that is “open to every white person” is a public function).
129. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1978) (implying that the
privatization of these government functions would not allow state and local governments to escape “the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
130. Communications on social network websites are not necessarily fully public,
as many social network websites offer users the ability to limit who is able to receive
particular messages, as well as the ability to send private messages, and listeners can
often choose from whom they wish to hear. However, real-world public spaces are
often no different; no one would object to construing a town square as a “public
place” just because an individual strolling through the square could choose to ignore a
speech being given there, or because that individual was able to have a private conversation with a friend in the middle of the square.
131. See Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506 (“The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up
his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.”). Social network websites have generally pursued a policy of openness, allowing all comers to be
members unless they violate the site’s terms of service. Some sites restrict access to
certain small groups of individuals—Facebook, for example, does not allow convicted
sex offenders to access its website. FACEBOOK, Statement, supra note 43.
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Social network websites are also able to accommodate millions upon
millions more speakers and listeners at once than almost any public space
that has ever existed in human memory.132 In the past, only governments
were able or willing to offer spaces that are even remotely comparable in
size for use by the public at large. While large privately owned spaces like
stadiums, airports, and shopping malls do exist, they have rarely been
dedicated to public speech or open to virtually all comers. In this sense,
social network websites provide a service that was previously “exclusively” provided by the State. Social network websites therefore serve a
public function that has both traditionally and exclusively been the province of the State, and therefore can be held to be state actors even under
a narrow view of the public function exception.
b. The Public Forum Doctrine
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132. Cf. boyd, supra note 7, at 54 (“While there are limits to how many people can
be in one physical space at a time, networked publics support the gathering of much
larger groups, synchronously and asynchronously.”).
133. Privately owned streets, sidewalks, and parks do exist, but common sense suggests that they are quite uncommon. The existence of these minor exceptions to the
general rule of government ownership and control of such spaces would defeat a finding of exclusivity only through the operation of a narrow and unthinking technicality.
134. The public forum doctrine applies only to spaces owned or operated by the
government. See NUNZIATO, supra note 94, at 72–73 (arguing that the public forum
doctrine does not apply to the internet); Balkin, supra note 50, at 2081 (“[T]here is no
‘traditional public forum’ for virtual spaces.”). Government-managed Facebook
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The case for treating social network websites as state actors under
the public function exception is further strengthened by comparing them
to the government-owned and government-controlled spaces that the
Court has protected under the First Amendment public forum doctrine.
In both form and function, social network websites strongly resemble the
spaces the Court has identified as traditional public forums, such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks, serving essentially the same role of providing a space for free expression, discussion, and debate of important
social and political issues. This strong resemblance between social network websites and traditional public forums thus further clarifies how social network websites serve a function that has both traditionally and
exclusively133 been the province of the state. At the same time, because
promoting speech in public forums promotes First Amendment values,
and because public forums and social network websites strongly resemble
each other in both form and function, it follows that protecting communications on social network websites would promote First Amendment values as well, even if the public forum doctrine would not apply to social
network websites per se.134 The public function exception and the public
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forum doctrine therefore dovetail neatly in making the case for extending
federal constitutional scrutiny to the actions of social network websites.
Under the public forum doctrine, restrictions on speech in public
spaces that have traditionally served as a venue for free expression and
debate are subject to special constitutional scrutiny. The public forum
doctrine owes its origin to two cases from the late 1930s, Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization135 and Schneider v. Irvington,136 which
established that the First Amendment protects speech in spaces that have
traditionally served as forums for the purpose of public discussion and the
dissemination of information, particularly streets and parks.137 Courts and
commentators have since established several convincing rationales for
this doctrine. For one, protecting such spaces ensures that “even if all
private property owners were permitted to discriminate against the
speech of their choosing, there would remain some publicly owned places
conducive to expressive purposes that the state must preserve as open
spaces for public discussion and debate.”138 Further, providing for access
to public forums helps to subsidize the speech of poorly financed speakers139 as well as undervalued speech,140 and it also ensures that “in public
places people may be confronted with speech they would rather avoid,”
which promotes cultural understanding and empathy and prevents our
political life from degenerating into factionalism and conflict.141
While Hague and Schneider established the basic form of the public
forum doctrine, the contemporary doctrine largely derives from Perry
Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,142 in which the Court
delineated three categories of spaces that receive differing levels of scrutiny under the public forum doctrine. The first category is the traditional
public forum, which may arise “by long tradition or by government fiat,”
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pages, however, might be conceived of as some form of public forum protected by the
First Amendment. See Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975,
1976–77 (2011).
135. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
136. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
137. See id. at 163; Hague, 307 U.S. at 515–16 (Roberts, J., concurring).
138. NUNZIATO, supra note 94, at 42.
139. Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1147 (2005).
140. David J. Goldstone, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Cyber Forum: Public vs. Private in Cyberspace Speech, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 9 (1998).
141. Noah D. Zatz, Note, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: Making Space for Public Forums in the Electronic Environment, 12 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 169 (1998); see
Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum — From Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58
OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1538–39 (1998).
142. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
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and in which the government may not engage in content regulation or
close the forum without a compelling governmental interest.143 The Court
typically describes traditional public forums as resembling “outdoor areas
that are not intimately connected with government facilities.”144 Thus,
traditional public forums include streets,145 sidewalks,146 and parks.147 The
second category is the limited public forum, which is property that has
been opened as a forum for public communication by the government.148
Limited public forums are treated like traditional public forums so long
as they are open to the public, but differ from public forums in that the
government may close off access to them entirely if it wishes to do so.149
The third category is the nonpublic forum, which is property that is not by
tradition or designation a forum for public communication. Access to
nonpublic forums may be regulated by the government so long as the
regulation is “reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.”150
While the Court has generally been reluctant to designate spaces
other than streets, sidewalks, and parks as public forums,151 public forums
need not be physical spaces—for example, the Court has held the array of
student organizations funded by a public university to be a limited public
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143. Id. at 45. It should be noted, however, that the Court is willing to uphold time,
place, and manner restrictions in traditional public forums. See, e.g., Frisby v. Shultz,
487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (upholding an ordinance prohibiting residential picketing
that focuses on and takes place outside of a particular residence).
144. FARBER, supra note 70, at 184.
145. See, e.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943); Schneider v. Irvington,
308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
146. See, e.g., Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 377 (1997)
(asserting that sidewalks are a “prototypical” public forum); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 318 (1988) (observing that “public streets and sidewalks[ ] [are] traditional public
fora”); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983) (holding that sidewalks
outside courthouse were public forums). But see United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S.
720, 727 (1990) (holding by plurality that a sidewalk connecting a post office to a
parking lot is not a traditional public forum).
147. See, e.g., Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
148. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
149. See id. at 46.
150. Id. (citation omitted).
151. See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676 (1998)
(televised presidential candidate debates); Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 695 (1992) (airport terminal); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 805–806 (1985) (annual fundraising drive conducted in federal offices); Members of the City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814 (1984) (utility poles); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (state fairgrounds); U.S. Postal Serv. v.
Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114, 133 (1981) (home mailbox).
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forum.152 The Court has recognized that speech in online spaces may
strongly resemble certain forms of speech in spaces traditionally protected under the public forum doctrine, such as pamphleteering in a public place.153 Some Justices, notably Justice Kennedy, have suggested that a
more functional approach to designating spaces as public forums might
be appropriate given recent technological developments and the decreasing relevance of streets, sidewalks, and parks for public expression.154 Several scholars share Justice Kennedy’s view, and some have been willing to
go further than the Court in arguing for extending the public forum doctrine to all or some online spaces.155
Spaces on the internet can easily be analogized to physical spaces.156
Indeed, if any spaces on the internet share a similarity in form or function
to the public streets, sidewalks, and parks that have been designated
traditional public forums, social network websites share the strongest resemblance to them. In terms of form, using Facebook can very much sim-
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152. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30
(1995).
153. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870, 880 (1997) (citing public forum doctrine
case law to compare the use of internet distribution mechanisms to pamphleteering).
Additionally, during the oral argument for Reno, Justice Kennedy stated that the internet is “a pretty public place, though, because anyone with a computer can get on
line . . . and convey information and images, so it is much like . . . a street corner or a
park, in a sense.” See Transcript of Oral Argument at 17–18, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844 (1997) (No. 96-511).
154. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,
802–803 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) (“Minds are not changed in streets and parks as they once
were. To an increasing degree, the more significant interchanges of ideas and shaping
of public consciousness occur in mass and electronic media. The extent of public entitlement to participate in those means of communication may be changed as technologies change. . . .” (citation omitted)).
155. See, e.g., Gey, supra note 141, at 1618–19; David J. Goldstone, The Public
Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information Superhighway, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 335
(1995); Nunziato, supra note 139, at 1161–64. Goldstone, however, only proposes that
government-owned or government-controlled internet spaces should be considered
public forums. See Goldstone, supra, at 383. Admittedly, however, courts have thus
far been skeptical of such arguments. For instance, two federal district courts have
rejected the argument that Google’s search engine is a public forum. Langdon v.
Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 632 (D. Del. 2007); Kinderstart.com, LLC v.
Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *14–15 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16,
2007).
156. See, e.g., Zatz, supra note 141, at 179–87 (comparing physical spaces to internet spaces); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 494 (exploring the use of physical metaphors to
describe cyberspace and contending that “courts and commentators have adopted the
cyberspace as place metaphor”).
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157. See boyd, supra note 7, at 45 (“Through mundane comments[ ] [on social network websites], participants are acknowledging one another in a public setting, similar
to the way in which they may greet each other if they were to bump into one another
on the street.”).
158. Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939); cf. NUNZIATO, supra note 94,
at 85 (arguing that the Internet is “the functional equivalent of the public town
square”).
159. See Eytan Bakshy, Rethinking Information Diversity in Networks, FACEBOOK
(Jan. 17, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-data-team/rethinking-information-diversity-in-networks/10150503499618859.
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ulate the experience of strolling down a public street or through a public
square in a small town.157 In scrolling down your news feed, you come
across both close friends and acquaintances, seeing what they are up to by
observing them silently from afar, or perhaps even stopping to chat with
them through a comment on a posting or through a private conversation.
You might also come across a group of individuals, including some you do
not know, discussing a social or political issue by commenting on some
material that someone has posted. You could even come across a protest
or a call to action, issued either by one of your friends or by one of the
groups whose updates you subscribe to.
Facebook also serves many of the same functions as traditional public forums. Today’s citizens are probably more likely to view an online
social network website like Facebook as a “natural and proper place[ ] for
the dissemination of information and opinion”158 than they are a public
street or park. Although our tradition of physically protesting in public
spaces is still alive and well, Facebook and similar social network websites
allow speakers to disseminate information at a very low cost and to a
fairly broad audience (though perhaps to fewer strangers than one might
come across in a traditional public forum). Further, audiences on such
websites are often confronted with speech that they would otherwise
avoid or not hear, contrary to the popular image of the online echo chamber.159 Therefore, in both form and function, social network websites
strongly resemble those spaces that have traditionally been open to public expression and debate by the government. This strong resemblance
between social network websites and traditional public forums further solidifies the case for extending the public function exception to social network websites, while at the same time clarifying how protecting
communications on social network websites would promote First Amendment values.
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2. The Entwinement Exception
The public function exception is, of course, but one of two exceptions to the state action doctrine. Under the entwinement exception, a
nongovernmental actor may be deemed a state actor “because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or
because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.”160 Thus, “private conduct must comply with the Constitution if the government has
authorized, encouraged, or facilitated the unconstitutional conduct,”161
for example by giving the nongovernmental party the authority to manage a publicly accessible property with the knowledge that the nongovernmental party will restrict access to the property in an
unconstitutionally discriminatory manner.162 In general, government licensing or regulation is insufficient for a finding of state action,163 and the
same is true for government financial support of a nongovernmental
party,164 unless the purpose of that financial support is to undermine the
protection of constitutional rights.165
Some commentators have argued that in light of the federal government’s involvement in the creation of the internet and its goal in doing so
of fostering communication and the free exchange of information, the
federal government should be viewed as sufficiently entwined with the
internet to justify treating some or all internet actors as state actors.166 In
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160. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982); see also Brentwood
Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (citation omitted) (“[S]tate action may be found . . . only if, there is such a ‘close nexus between the
State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be fairly
treated as that of the State itself.’ ”); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S.
715, 724 (1961).
161. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 86, at 529.
162. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966).
163. See, e.g., Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999); Jackson v.
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974); Columbia Broad. Sys. v. Democratic
Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 140 (1973); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177
(1972).
164. For example, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832, 841–42 (1982), the
Court held that a private school that received over 90 percent of its funds from the
state was not a state actor so long as its actions were not “compelled or even influenced by any state regulation.”
165. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 569 (1974) (stating that
government may not support private schools with racially discriminatory admissions
policies); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 467–68 (1973) (stating that Mississippi
may not aid private schools that practice racial discrimination).
166. See NUNZIATO, supra note 94, at 99; Jennifer Arnette-Mitchell, Note, State
Action Doctrine Reborn Again: Why the Constitution Should Act as a Checking Mechanism for ICANN’s Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, 27 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
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its broadest form this argument proves too much, as it could be used to
justify treating virtually any internet actor as a state actor, and in its narrow form it does not apply to social network websites, which the government did not have a hand in creating. Moreover, courts have consistently
rejected such arguments.167
Courts have also thus far rejected claims that social network websites or their parent companies have relationships with the government
that show sufficient entwinement to demonstrate state action. Federal
courts have rejected the argument that Facebook is a state actor because
of its contracts with government agencies, which allow the agencies to
operate pages on Facebook,168 as well as the argument that Google (which
operates the social network websites Google+ and YouTube) is entwined
with the State because Google is working on a collaborative digital libraries project with state universities.169 Such claims are likely to continue to
be unavailing given the rather minimal nature of the contacts between the
State and social network websites: at the moment, state, federal, and local
governments appear to use social network websites merely as a basic
communication tool, and they do not have any special relationship with
the sites.170 Thus, at the moment, social network websites would almost
certainly not be classified as state actors under the entwinement
exception.
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POL’Y 307, 342–46 (2006) (arguing that the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (“ICANN”) should be viewed as a state actor since it is a delegatee of
the federal government’s authority to regulate the internet and because its policies
are in part the result of government encouragement); A. Michael Froomkin, Wrong
Turn in Cyberspace: Using ICANN to Route Around the APA and the Constitution, 50
DUKE L.J. 17, 113–25 (2000) (arguing that it is at least plausible that ICANN can be
considered a state actor under existing Supreme Court precedents).
167. See McNeil v. Verisign, Inc., 127 Fed. App’x 913, 914 (9th Cir. 2005) (ICANN
is not a state actor, despite the fact that it was first established by agencies of the
United States government to administer the internet domain name system); Murawski
v. Pataki, 514 F. Supp. 2d 577, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (Yahoo! was not “transformed into
a state actor because it benefited from early public funding of the development of the
internet”); Island Online, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 289, 307
(E.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting the argument that the government was entwined in the
obscenity policy of a private domain name registrant).
168. See Young v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:10-cv-03579-JF/PVT, 2010 WL 4269304, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010).
169. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631 (D. Del. 2007); KinderStart.com v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637, at
*42–44 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (unpublished decision).
170. This claim applies only to the United States, as some foreign governments
have been more active in involving themselves in the censorial conduct of social network websites, as is the case with several foreign governments and Twitter. See
Sengupta, supra note 13.
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Yet given that such claims are highly fact-specific, one could easily
imagine scenarios in which litigants could be successful on a claim against
a social network website based on the entwinement exception. For example, if Facebook began censoring messages related to WikiLeaks as part
of a coordinated effort with federal agencies, such censorship might satisfy the entwinement exception, and be deemed state action. Similarly, a
joint initiative between social network websites and the government to
protect children from sexual predators could potentially invoke the
entwinement exception, based on what form it took and the extent of the
State’s involvement. Thus, while it is currently unlikely that social network websites would be deemed state actors under the entwinement exception, courts can and should hold social network websites to be state
actors under the entwinement exception in situations in which it applies.
3. Judicial Restraint and the Limits of Existing Doctrine
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171. See Berman, supra note 91, at 1272.
172. To the Cyber Promotions court, the existence of such alternatives was dispositive with respect to the court’s rejection of the applicability to AOL of the exclusivity
argument. Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 443
(E.D. Pa. 1996). In Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Supreme Court rejected
the argument that certain types of speech could be proscribed on the internet because
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Despite the foregoing arguments, the claim that social network websites should be characterized as state actors remains vulnerable to attack
on several grounds, which could further discourage courts that are already disinclined to stake out new territory on the frontiers of the First
Amendment and the state action doctrine. For one, there is simply no
getting around the fact that social network websites are run by private
companies for profit, which argues for placing a somewhat heavier thumb
on the property rights end of the scale in cases involving social network
websites than in cases involving government-administered public spaces.
Additionally, social network websites’ ability to regulate spaces that resemble public squares may not really be all that problematic when we
consider that debate and meaningful public speech in such spaces is a
relatively rare occurrence, and such spaces are virtually nonexistent in
many municipalities, particularly those in suburbs and exurbs.171 Lastly,
even though not being able to access a social network website could be
particularly damaging to a speaker’s ability to get their message out, numerous alternatives to such websites do exist, including other websites,
mail, newspapers, magazines, television, and passing out leaflets, which
could lead a court to be more comfortable with censorial acts by social
network websites.172
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A hesitant court thus has plenty of material to work with. One can
imagine how such a court might consider these competing arguments in a
hypothetical case involving Facebook. Suppose the following:
Facebook wants to enter a large market in which it does not currently compete. This new market is governed by a particularly repressive and autocratic regime notorious for violating human
rights. Because of the regime’s actions, criticism, discussion, and
protest of the regime have become relatively common among
American users on Facebook. For example, American Facebook
users post status updates that share news stories and editorials
criticizing the regime for its human rights record, which sparks
commentary and debate amongst their friends; they belong to
Facebook groups which espouse viewpoints critical of the regime;
and they and the groups to which they belong use Facebook to
promote public protests of the regime.
Facebook, in the hopes of appeasing the regime and convincing it
that it will not undermine its authority, censors some of the content that is critical of the regime and promotes material that is
favorable to it. Rather than simply ham-handedly deleting critical
content or groups, Facebook instead engages in more subtle forms
of censorship, such as modifying its graph search to hide Facebook
groups and pages critical of the regime and removing them from
user suggestions.
In response, a user administering a group affected by these
changes sues Facebook, alleging a violation of her First Amendment rights, and claiming that Facebook’s censorial actions can be
viewed as state action under the public function exception.
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there were ample non-internet avenues of communication available for speakers. Id.
at 879–80.
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There is no clear answer as to what the result in this hypothetical
case would be. The plaintiff will argue that Facebook is serving as a substitute for or supplement to real-world forums like public forums, and
therefore it is performing a function that is both traditionally and exclusively the province of the State. The plaintiff will also argue that subjecting Facebook to First Amendment restrictions is wholly reasonable, as it
would merely forbid Facebook from engaging in viewpoint discrimination
unless it can be justified by some countervailing and legitimate compelling interest.
Facebook will have several strong arguments with which to counter
these claims. First, Facebook will point out that the plaintiffs are swimming against doctrinal currents, and that courts have overwhelmingly

33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 83 Side B

02/06/2014 10:11:19

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NMX\44-1\NMX104.txt

156

unknown

Seq: 36

4-FEB-14

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

13:06

[Vol. 44

III. ALTERNATIVE PATHS TO PROTECTION
It may, of course, be possible to shield communications on social
network websites from the censor’s hand without requiring federal courts
to creatively interpret federal constitutional law. The three primary
means of achieving this are state constitutional law, state and federal legislation, and federal media access regulations. This Part addresses how
each of these alternative approaches is less desirable and less viable as a
long-term solution than securing court-recognized First Amendment protections for communications on social network websites.

33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 83 Side B

held privately owned internet companies not to be state actors. Then,
Facebook will point out that not only does it not offer municipal services,
but also it is a for-profit company that generates revenues from advertising and that faces competition for users’ time and advertisers’ dollars
from other social network websites and other forms of entertainment. In
this sense, Facebook will argue that no government has ever engaged in
the activities that form the core of its business, and therefore it does not
serve any function that has “traditionally,” let alone “exclusively,” been
the province of the state. Further, Facebook will argue that applying First
Amendment scrutiny to its actions unduly interferes with its private property rights and ability to manage its business, and could open up the
floodgates to attacks by groups bent on destroying the valuable atmosphere and infrastructure of the site, such as distributors of pornography.
The plaintiffs will cry foul, arguing that Facebook is trying to have
things both ways with respect to whether the site is a public space (as its
advertising suggests) or a private one (its stance in the litigation), but
Facebook will counter that it is a commonplace for privately owned businesses to open their premises to the public at large while still retaining
ultimate control over access to their properties.
It is easy, given the existing case law, to imagine a court siding with
Facebook, citing both judicial restraint and the availability of alternative
paths to protection such as state constitutional law, federal and state legislation, and federal media access regulations. But with regard to the former, the foregoing arguments in this Part demonstrate that it is wholly
defensible for courts to hold that social network websites are state actors,
even within the bounds of existing doctrine. And with regard to the latter,
a brief but careful examination should make clear that this argument carries little water.
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A. State Constitutional Law
State constitutional law might provide an alternative path to protection for communications on social network websites.173 State courts can
step into the breach left by the federal constitution’s under-protection of
constitutional rights,174 and their doing so offers several advantages over
federal solutions, including allowing for greater experimentation and being easier to reverse by democratic means.175 Ultimately, though, this approach is a less-than-ideal alternative to the recognition by federal courts
of First Amendment protections for communications on social network
websites.
Several states’ high courts have already recognized rights under
their state constitutions that could be used to establish protections for
speech on social network websites, despite the fact that social network
websites are privately owned spaces. For example, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Logan Valley line of cases, the Supreme
Court of California concluded that the California Constitution protects
speech and petitioning in privately owned shopping centers,176 and the
federal Supreme Court affirmed this decision and found that states could
recognize a right of access to shopping centers under their own state constitutions.177 Then, in the 2001 case of Golden Gateway Center v. Golden
Gateway Tenants Ass’n,178 a plurality of the California Supreme Court
suggested that private property in California may be subject to the speech
provisions of the California Constitution if it is the “functional equivalent
of a traditional public forum.”179 The Supreme Court of California has
also in recent years taken a more expansive view of the state action doctrine under the federal constitution than federal courts have been willing

R

02/06/2014 10:11:19

C M
Y K

R

33996-nmx_44-1 Sheet No. 84 Side A

173. See, e.g., Goldstone, supra note 140, at 23 (“An alternative strategy for parties
seeking access in private forums is to establish a right of access based on state law.”);
Nunziato, supra note 139, at 1164–67 (arguing that state courts should interpret the
free speech provisions of their state constitutions to extend to internet forums).
174. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, What Does—And Does Not—Ail State Constitutional
Law, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 709 (2011) (“At issue is whether state action violates the
Federal Constitution. If the state constitution prohibits the law or conduct at issue,
however, there is no work for the Federal Constitution to do.”); William J. Brennan,
Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489,
503 (1977).
175. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, Speech, Why Teach—And Why Study—State Constitutional Law, 34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 165, 173–78 (2009).
176. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341, 347 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447
U.S. 74 (1980).
177. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
178. 29 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
179. Id. at 810.
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180. See Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 311 (Cal. 2003) (“[T]he use of government power, whether in enforcement of a statute or ordinance or by an award of
damages or an injunction in a private lawsuit, is state action that must comply with
First Amendment limits.”).
181. 650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994).
182. Id. at 770.
183. See Curious Theatre Co. v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, 220 P.3d 544,
551–52 (Colo. 2009).
184. Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 91, at 1307 (citing Batchelder v.
Allied Stores Int’l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 595 (Mass. 1983); Alderwood Assocs. v.
Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108, 116–17 (Wash. 1981) (plurality opinion)).
185. Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 91, at 1306.
186. Id. at 1306.
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to do.180 As Facebook and several other popular social network websites
are based in California, California state constitutional law could thus
prove a potent weapon in the battle over censorship on social network
websites.
Outside of California, in New Jersey Coalition Against War in the
Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty,181 the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that
“the New Jersey Constitution’s right of free speech is broader than the
right against governmental abridgement of speech found in the First
Amendment,” and held that under the New Jersey Constitution private
shopping malls must allow leafleting and related nondisruptive exercises
of free speech rights on their property.182 Colorado will sometimes enforce the freedom of expression protections of its constitution against
nongovernmental entities.183 Less expansively, Massachusetts and Washington have recognized a limited expressive right in private malls to collect signatures for electoral petitions, though they have based these
rulings on rights relating to free elections, rather than on speech rights
alone.184
However, at least seventeen state high courts have held that the
state action requirement of their constitution is identical to that formulated by the Supreme Court,185 and “[f]ew states have followed California
in accepting the Supreme Court’s invitation to adopt state free speech
protections more expansive than those guaranteed by the First Amendment.”186 Further, pursuing state constitutional law as a means for protecting communications on social network websites has several major
drawbacks. First is the problem of incomplete coverage—as is already
evident from the existing case law, the possibility of obtaining protections
for social network websites under all, or even most, states’ constitutions is
slim to none, especially when one considers the steep costs of state-by-
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state litigation.187 This problem is compounded by the realities of geography. Social network websites may have headquarters and offices in certain physical locations, but their users are literally everywhere. Subjecting
social network websites to a fifty-state regulatory regime is a recipe for
confusion, especially when one considers that state constitutional law
often results in less-than-coherent doctrine.188 Additionally, given the possibility for divergent approaches amongst the states, complicated choiceof-law and jurisdictional questions appear to be inevitable,189 further casting doubt on the viability of an approach based on state-by-state
litigation.
State constitutional law therefore does provide a possible alternative to the recognition of First Amendment protections for communications on social network websites by federal courts, but given its major
drawbacks it is a less desirable approach than securing federal constitutional protections.
B. State and Federal Legislation
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187. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Essay, Two Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1699–1700 (2010) (arguing that relying on state constitutions to
protect rights “never will provide more than partial success” and noting that state-bystate litigation is expensive).
188. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90
MICH. L. REV. 761, 763 (1992) (“[S]tate constitutional law today is a vast wasteland of
confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements.”).
189. See Goldstone, supra note 140, at 25–26.
190. See Zatz, supra note 141, at 227 (arguing that Congress has power under the
Commerce Clause to regulate activity on the internet).
191. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2004).
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Legislation at the state and federal levels could also provide an alternative path to protection for communications on social network websites. At the federal level, as most social network websites are for-profit
businesses that serve customers across state lines, it seems that Congress
would have adequate Commerce Clause power to regulate at least some
of the activities of social network websites.190 At the state level, the legislature of California has already passed a statute aimed at deterring “strategic lawsuits against public participation,” commonly known as
“SLAPPs,” granting individuals the right to speak and petition freely in
“public forums,” regardless of whether they are publicly or privately
owned.191
Such legislation could have several potential benefits over other
means of regulating social network websites, such as allowing for more
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dynamic custom-tailoring as the legislation is amended over time, and facilitating enforcement by providing for sanctions or inducements.192
However, the legislative approach suffers from an Achilles heel: legislation is undoubtedly a form of state action, which means it would be
subject to First Amendment scrutiny by courts. The viability of this approach to protecting communications on social network websites will
therefore depend on the level of scrutiny applied by courts (a topic beyond the scope of this article), as well as how solicitous courts are willing
to be of the government’s case for the interests served by the legislation,
which the social network websites would argue interferes with their First
Amendment rights. In addition, defining statutory terms that adequately
describe new and emerging technologies is notoriously difficult, which
raises the prospect of such legislation being struck down as unconstitutionally vague or overbroad if it is not worded carefully.193 While state or
federal legislation is thus an attractive alternative to a court-oriented approach to securing protection of communications on social network websites, it is an endeavor mired in uncertainty and risk, and therefore less
viable and desirable than securing federal constitutional protections.
C. Federal Media Access Regulations
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192. See Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633, 672–73 (1991).
193. For example, a federal court recently struck down a Louisiana statute that
banned sex offenders from using social network websites because the statutory definition of “social networking” was overbroad, potentially extending to cover “many
commonly read news and information websites.” Doe v. Jindal, 853 F. Supp. 2d 596,
604 (M.D. La. 2012).
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Regulations issued by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) could potentially provide a third alternative path to protection for
communications on social network websites. For example, the FCC could
issue a rule that prevents social network websites from restricting access
based on a user’s views on political or social issues. This approach is an
inferior alternative to court-recognized First Amendment protections for
communications on social network websites for several reasons. As a preliminary matter, the FCC probably lacks the statutory authority to issue
such rules. Even if the FCC had the authority, such regulations would
likely be held unconstitutional given the Supreme Court’s recent approach to media access regulations. Moreover, as a matter of general policy there are several reasons to believe that media access regulations for
social network websites are ill advised.
First, the FCC probably lacks the authority to issue rules regarding
access to or discrimination by social network websites. Under the Com-
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munications Act of 1934 (as amended by the Telecommunications Act of
1996), the FCC lacks explicit authority to regulate the internet,194 but it
can regulate access to internet content under its “ancillary authority”
under Title I of the Act,195 which authorizes the FCC to make regulations
as necessary to effectuate its specifically delegated functions (which can
be broadly and loosely defined as regulating the transmission of telecommunications).196 However, in Comcast Corp. v. FCC,197 the D.C. Circuit
held that the FCC failed to argue with specificity its statutory basis to
regulate broadband internet data management practices,198 stating that
even if some kinds of obligations on cable internet providers are within
the FCC’s Title I ancillary authority, the fairly basic ones at issue in the
case were not.199 Comcast thus casts serious doubt on the FCC’s authority
to regulate access to the internet pursuant to its Title I ancillary jurisdiction,200 and if the FCC cannot regulate network management by internet
service providers (ISPs) or access to the internet as a whole under Title I,
it is hard to imagine the FCC has the authority under Title I to regulate
access to or discrimination by social network websites.201 In addition, even
if the FCC did have the authority to regulate the transmission of internet
data under its Title II common carrier authority,202 that authority would
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194. See Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The Communications Act defines two categories of entities relevant to the FCC’s authority to regulate internet entities: telecommunications carriers and information-service providers.
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 975
(2005). Telecommunications carriers are subject to mandatory common carrier regulations under Title II, whereas information-service providers are not. See id. at 975–76.
Computing and the internet have traditionally been interpreted as falling in the information-service-providers category. Philip F. Weiss, Note, Protecting a Right to Access
Internet Content, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 383, 391 (2011). For example, the Supreme
Court has upheld an FCC determination that cable internet service providers (ISPs)
are information-service providers. See Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 988–89.
The FCC has, however, recently asserted that the “transmission component” of internet service is a “telecommunications service” that can be regulated pursuant to
Title II of the Communications Act, but whether this interpretation is valid is a matter
of open debate. See infra note 202.
195. See Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. at 975–76.
196. See 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006).
197. 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
198. Id. at 661.
199. Id. at 650.
200. See Weiss, supra note 194, at 401–402.
201. Of course, this assumes that social network websites fall under the statutory
definition of an information-services provider, see 47 U.S.C. § 153 (2012), which is
also debatable.
202. The FCC responded to Comcast with its “Third Way” proposal, which asserts
that broadband internet service can be separated into two categories for regulatory
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almost certainly not permit the FCC to regulate social network websites,
as such websites are not involved in the transmission of internet data—
they are among the data that is transmitted. Thus, the FCC probably does
not have the authority to issue rules regarding access to or discrimination
by social network websites.
Yet even supposing the FCC has authority to regulate access to social network websites, it is highly likely that such regulations would be
found unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s recent approach to
media access regulations. From the late 1960s through the mid-1990s, the
Court upheld several regulations that aimed to provide speakers with
greater access to broadcast media due to a fear that “much of the nation’s
communication system [would] reflect only the views of a small privileged
minority.”203 In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,204 the Court upheld an
FCC regulation known as the “fairness doctrine,” which mandated that
broadcasters give fair coverage of opposing viewpoints on issues of public
importance.205 The Court justified this holding by noting the scarcity of
opportunities for speech in the broadcast media (with the scarcity itself
traceable to the government’s issuing of broadcast licenses to only a small
group of broadcasting companies), expressing a fear of “monopolization”
of the “marketplace of ideas” through the operation of “unlimited private
censorship . . . in a medium not open to all.”206 The Court noted that
without the fairness doctrine, “station owners and a few networks would
have unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders,
to communicate only their own views on public issues, people and candidates, and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed.”207
Because leaving a broadcasting licensee unregulated would give them
broad speech-restricting powers, the FCC could require them to “share
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purposes: a “transmission” component that the FCC can regulate pursuant to Title
II’s common carriage requirements, and an “information” component that the FCC
can regulate subject to its Title I ancillary authority. See Austin Schlick, A Third-Way
Legal Framework for Addressing the Comcast Dilemma, BROADBAND.GOV (May 6,
2010) http://www.broadband.gov/third-way-legal-framework-for-addressing-the-comcast-dilemma.html. The FCC’s assertion that it can regulate access to the internet
under Title II has since been challenged by regulated parties, the House of Representatives, and legal scholars, and remains a source of ongoing controversy. See generally
Weiss, supra note 194, at 401–402 & nn.116–21.
203. FARBER, supra note 70, at 214.
204. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
205. Id. at 375. The FCC later repealed the fairness doctrine, noting the increase in
the availability of information services since Red Lion. See FCC, Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees,
102 F.C.C.2d 145 (1985).
206. Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 390, 392.
207. Id. at 392.
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208. Id. at 389.
209. 453 U.S. 367 (1981).
210. Id. at 387, 396–97.
211. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
212. Id. at 643–44. The Court remanded the case to the district court, which found
the must-carry rule unconstitutional, a result that was later affirmed by the Court on
appeal. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997).
213. Turner, 453 U.S. at 672–73.
214. See id. at 648–49. The dissenters disagreed on this point, finding the rationale
for the statute content-based. See id. at 677–78 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
215. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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[their] frequency with others and to conduct [themselves] as a proxy or
fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are
representative of [their] community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.”208
Following Red Lion, the Court upheld regulations of television
broadcasting in several other cases. In CBS, Inc. v. FCC,209 the Court upheld a federal statute requiring broadcasters to “allow reasonable access
to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time” by candidates
for federal office.210 Most notably, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
FCC,211 the Court upheld a federal statute commonly known as the
“must-carry rule,” which required cable systems to transmit local commercial and public broadcasting stations.212 Though the Court’s holding
was based primarily on the rationale that the must-carry rule served the
legitimate purpose of preventing the destruction of the television broadcasting industry,213 the Court also noted that a subsidiary goal of the rule
was to prevent the loss to public discourse that would be caused by decisions of cable programmers to deny access to local and educational programming.214 These cases suggest that regulations aimed at preventing a
small group of entities from monopolizing access to an important medium
for speech are constitutional.
As social network websites are now one such important medium for
speech, Red Lion, CBS, and Turner could therefore theoretically furnish
a constitutional justification for federal regulations that mandate access
to social network websites. This argument is likely to be unavailing for
several reasons. First, the Court has suggested that the scarcity rationale
it embraced in the earlier broadcasting cases is no longer applicable in a
world of cable television and the internet. Regarding the internet, in
Reno v. ACLU,215 the Court rejected the argument that the internet itself
was a “‘scarce’ expressive commodity” because the various means of
communicating on the internet, including chat rooms, webpages, newsgroups, and “mail exploders,” give individuals a multitude of internet-
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216. Id. at 870.
217. See id. at 868–70.
218. See generally Thomas W. Hazlett, Sarah Oh & Drew Clark, The Overly Active
Corpse of Red Lion, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 51 (2010).
219. An analogy between social network websites and newspapers is apt, given the
arguments in Part II.A regarding freedom of the press and given that social network
websites, like newspapers, bring together content, distribution, and advertising into a
single business model. See supra Part II.A; see also HAZLETT ET AL., supra note 218,
at 94 n.274.
220. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
221. See id. at 256–58.
222. See FARBER, supra note 70, at 216.
223. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
224. Id. at 743–47.
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based means through which to communicate.216 The Court thus found the
internet greatly different from broadcasting, and accordingly refused to
extend Red Lion and its progeny to the internet.217
Even if it is true that opportunities to speak on the internet are virtually limitless, social network websites are especially important and distinguishable from other websites in that they serve a unique social and
political function. In addition, because of network effects, at any given
time there will be only a small handful of dominant social network websites, making them a scarce resource. Given their importance, limited
number, and capacity for restricting especially valuable speech, social network websites are thus much more analogous to the dominant flagship
television broadcasters of yore than they are to the average website, chat
room, or email service. But the fact remains that Red Lion is still
dead218—and with it probably any hope that the Court will backtrack
from Reno.
Second, a court disinclined to find regulations relating to access to
social network websites constitutional could also draw from the Court’s
treatment of access mandates for newspapers219 and its recent treatment
of federal regulations of cable programming. With respect to newspapers,
in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,220 the Court held that laws
mandating access to space in newspapers are unconstitutional given newspapers’ need to exercise editorial judgment and control,221 completely ignoring the fact that in most cities, opportunities for speech in newspapers
are even scarcer than those on television stations.222
With respect to cable programming, in Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,223 the Court upheld some
federal regulations of indecent cable programming,224 refusing to apply
the categorical standards the Court had developed in prior First Amendment cases because such approaches all “suffer from the same flaws . . .
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225. Id. at 740.
226. See id. at 776–77 (Souter, J., concurring).
227. See Jerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flight from First Amendment Doctrine: Justice Breyer’s New Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 817,
868 (1998) (arguing that Justice Breyer’s opinion in Denver Area adopts an approach
where “[a]ccess rights must be weighed against the free speech rights of the cable
operator”). But see Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 384 (1999)
(arguing that Denver Area “was a case about access rights” and that a majority of
justices in the case “treated decisions by cable operators not to carry programming as
‘censorial,’ and acknowledged that the availability of access to such a medium was a
question of constitutional moment”).
228. 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
229. Id. at 818, 826–27.
230. Id. at 818.
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[in that] [t]hey import law developed in very different contexts into a new
and changing environment, and they lack the flexibility necessary to allow
government to respond to very serious practical problems without sacrificing the free exchange of ideas the First Amendment is designed to protect.”225 In a concurrence, Justice Souter expressed concern over the
Court’s making a strong pronouncement on First Amendment principles
while communications technology is in a state of flux.226
The Court thus signaled its hesitance to interfere with industries experiencing rapid change, and strongly implied that the scarcity rationale
underpinning the Red Lion line of cases no longer has much bite, except
to the extent that the Court will now weigh the public’s access rights
against the interests of private telecommunications companies.227 The
Court reinforced these messages in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,228 where the Court invalidated a regulation requiring cable
operators to scramble pornographic channels or to limit programming on
those channels to certain hours,229 emphasizing that cable “expands the
capacity to choose” and expressing the worry that government regulation
would endanger the potential of the ongoing technological “revolution.”230
Taken together, these cases suggest that it is unlikely that the Court
would hold regulations mandating access to social network websites constitutional, as these cases appear to appear to undermine any claim that
the scarcity of speaking opportunities within an important medium for
communication is constitutionally dispositive, and they suggest that the
Court is very hesitant to tread on private property rights in industries
characterized by rapid innovation and development, as the social network
website industry surely is. Such hesitance is certainly justifiable, as access
regulations would run a very real risk of stifling innovation on social net-
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work websites,231 and would likely make it more difficult for social network websites to organize, sort, and filter content, which is one of the
primary ways in which they add value to users’ internet experiences232
(even if their power to do so at the same time creates the potential for
abuse).233 As both a matter of constitutional doctrine and general policy,
then, the case for such access regulations stands on shaky ground. Pursuing federal media access regulations as an alternative to court-recognized
First Amendment protections for communications on social network
websites is therefore ill-advised.
CONCLUSION
Social network websites present us with a strange juxtaposition: on
the one hand, social network websites are incomparably open and tolerant venues for expression of all kinds, and on the other hand, they are
essentially Constitution-free zones where the threat of censorship, both
overt and subtle, looms large. Even if other actors such as state courts,
state legislatures, or Congress are willing to step in to protect users of
social network websites, the censorship anticipated by this article may
nonetheless jeopardize the future of online speech. As speech in our
streets, on our sidewalks, and within our parks increasingly becomes
eclipsed in importance by that on social network websites, one cannot
help but be troubled by the lack of constitutional protections that communications on social network websites may face as a consequence of the
state action doctrine. But if courts are willing to take a fresh perspective
on the public function exception to the state action doctrine in light of the
strong arguments for extending First Amendment protections to commu-
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231. See John Blevins, The New Scarcity: A First Amendment Framework for Regulating Access to Digital Media Platforms, 79 TENN. L. REV. 353, 357, 416 (2012) (arguing that subjecting regulations of social network websites to higher First Amendment
scrutiny will protect innovation from “unnecessary and harmful regulatory
intervention”).
232. See Balkin, Digital Speech, supra note 49, at 7 (arguing that the digital revolution “brings to the forefront the importance of organizing, sorting, filtering, and limiting access to information, as well as the cultural power of those who organize, sort,
filter, and limit access”); Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet
as an Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 701–02, 757 (2010)
(arguing that the internet cannot be experienced except through intermediaries and
that the Court’s jurisprudence recognizes “that the exercise of editorial discretion by
intermediaries facilitating electronic communication serves important free speech
values”).
233. Extending First Amendment scrutiny to social network websites could admittedly also lead to both of these negative effects, but would likely be less intrusive and
less likely to ossify over time than administrative rules.
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nications on social network websites, perhaps the fears expressed in this
article can be converted into brighter hopes for the future of online
speech.
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